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BATTLESPACE / INFORMATION WAR 
(BAT/IW):  
A System-of-Systems Model of a Strike Operation 
Donald P. Gaver 
Patricia A. Jacobs 
Abstract 
This paper presents a low-resolution, high-level modeling methodology 
for the analysis of the effectiveness of a Blue system of systems operating in a 
battlespace. The methodology enables quick turn around and efficient exploration 
of sensitivities of measures of Blue combat success to realistically imperfect Blue 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities: limited and imperfect 
sensor surveillance and reconnaissance, particularly battle damage assessment 
(BDA), and finite, hence saturable, communications and weapons delivery 
capability. The model explicitly represents aircraft sorties, fires, sensor/shooter 
latencies, target losses, imperfect target type classification, imperfect weapon 
assignment, and BDA; various levels of the above imperfections can be applied, 
facilitating tradeoff studies.  
The model is deterministic/expected value in nature, although it 
analytically represents time-dependent stochastic features such as system 
saturability. Model experimentation suggests the following results. Decreasing 
shooter latency can result in greater attrition than correspondingly increasing the 
probabilities of correct BDA or weapon assignment, although at the expense of a 
greater number of weapons fired per target killed. Erroneous BDA returns dead 
targets to the shooter targeting list. These dead targets not only result in wasted 
weapon expenditure but also take sensor/shooter resources away from legitimate 
live targets. Increasing the probability of correct BDA can result in a greater 
number of targets killed during a time period than increasing the probability of 
correct weapon assignment. 
i 
1. Introduction 
This paper provides a low-resolution, high-level methodology “scoping model” for 
analysis of a Blue strike operation: missile-shooting and manned aircraft sortie response 
to a Red ground force that enters a region for hostile purposes (regional occupancy with 
territorial objective, staging for missile, e.g., SCUD, shots, etc.). For example, the 
beginning of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). The model proposed facilitates 
efficient initial exploration of sensitivities of measures of Blue combat success to 
realistically imperfect Blue intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and 
information warfare (IW) capabilities: limited and imperfect sensor surveillance and 
reconnaissance, particularly BDA, and finite, hence saturable, communications and 
weapons delivery capability. The effect of both Red and Blue (aircraft) decoys and false 
targets are implicitly present and readily analyzed. It is proposed that somewhat more 
detailed representation of Red air defense (AD) and Blue suppression of enemy air 
defense ((J)SEAD) be included in the present formulation. The ultimate aim of the model 
is to suggest the value of alternative operational architectures and investment programs.  
The model realistically, but economically, assesses the capability of limited Blue 
system-of-system capacities to provide needed services: sensor regional coverage and 
potential target classification capability; communication, with delays (bandwidth limits); 
and shooter firing rate and lethality. Highly nonlinear unfavorable responses to 
deficiencies in such capabilities, and in their relative balance and mutual compatibility, 
are easily and quickly revealed by exploration of the model. These deficiencies can be 
potentially rectified by suitably improving, modifying, and balancing Sensor-Shooter 
capabilities. In particular the effect of reducing bandwidth requirements, e.g., by storing 
and occasionally updating slowly changing information appropriately, is implicitly 
reflected in the model: the above effect simply increases service rates (decreases latency). 
Sensitivity to such an architectural design possibility is traceable using the model; the 
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effect may be considerable whenever the original system operates near a saturation level, 
wherein message traffic nearly reaches or exceeds available processing capacity 
(bandwidth). The model does not, however, address any downside issues associated with 
increased local information storage. 
1.1 Model Features 
In the models of the present paper realism and needed detail are introduced, but 
parsimoniously. In particular (see Figure 1),  
Spatial considerations are accounted for: the region R is viewed as a collection of 
non-overlapping and inclusive subregions {Ri, i = 1, 2, …, I}; for instance, choice 
of these allow for explicit range dependencies (introduction of range bands is a 
convenient simple device). The exact specification of the subregions is left to 
analyst discretion; it may be reasonable to let these be internally homogeneous in 
the sense of terrain, hence visibility. The number of subregions is arbitrary in 
principle, but limited by computational considerations. Some averaging within 
and between subregions is inevitable. If desired, and meaningful, a subregion can 
be an established route, e.g., road, from one point to another.  
• 
• Red force type variability is recognized: types are broad but flexible, being at 
present and only for example, Heavily Armored Vehicles (generically Tanks or 
Hard Targets), Light Armored Vehicles (Armored Personnel Carriers), 
Unarmored Vehicles (Trucks, etc.), Infantry, … generically classified as Soft 
Targets. The state of Red forces is taken to be characterized (at minimum) by the 
numbers of each of its force elements (see above) in each of the designated 
subregions at a particular time. If desired, the above state description can be 
extended or expanded (for instance, the numbers of Red targets in a particular 
formation, moving or still at a given time, can be recorded as state variables that 
evolve together as time elapses); the above is essential to a dynamic description of 
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system evolution. The state of Red is a (vector-valued) description that changes 
dynamically in time, responding to Red territorial objectives, and in reaction to 
actions by the Blue force.  
Red force mobility/maneuver across subregions (e.g., advance or retreat) is 




Blue Sensor and ISR (“Network-Centric”) force capabilities and actions are 
modeled (for operational effect, without engineering systems-level detail): the 
Sensor effort (“servicing capacity”) allocated to subregion Ri at any time 
determines the rate at which data on Red occupancy of that subregion can be 
obtained and transferred to a Blue candidate-for-targeting list; note that the model 
recognizes that it takes time for Blue Sensor/ISR assets to discover/process data 
on Red presence in a subregion, so if insufficient Blue assets are available there, 
an effective queue/waiting line develops made up of undetected Reds. The 
variation and adaptation of Blue Sensor assets across space (subregions) in 
response to Red movements and actions is a feature of modern Network-Centric 
warfare. It is also realistic to model the realistic errors, delays, and susceptibility 
to deception and jamming inherent in any information-gathering system; this is 
done in such a way as to allow assessment of the value of increased Sensor asset 
capability, and tactics for employment thereof.  
The fact that Red forces (types and locations) are known by Blue only after delay and 
with error is represented by the Sensor/ISR submodel. In reality, Blue must act on the 
basis of an imperfect quantitative perception of the true Red state. The consequences of 
that imperfection are that his subsequent actions (“shooting,” maneuvering) are affected. 
Our model indicates the value of altering the system components of our  
system-of-systems.  
Blue Shooter’s varied assets and capabilities are represented in adjustable detail: 
surface-surface and air-surface missiles or bombs are viewed as tailored to, or 
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optimized for, particular target types. For instance, a weapon suited to destruction 
of Heavy Armor can certainly kill Light Armor, but at greater than necessary 
expense per round, but a weapon optimized for Light Armor or Infantry will 
likely have small chance of killing Heavy Armor. The effect of misallocating 
weapons to targets, largely caused by ISR mistakes and delays, but also 
influenced by logistics (weapon supply), can be substantial, as measured by cost 
to Blue in own casualties, in dollars, and in campaign length. Of course the 
number, hence shooting (“service”) rate of the Blue Shooter (missile firing tubes, 
plus aircraft sorties) influences the length of the target queue: the greater the gross 
Shooter rate, the shorter the delay in targeting a Red that has been detected and 
classified (although possibly incorrectly) by the Blue Sensor. As the rate of target 
addition to the Shooter Target List/Queue increases, the greater the (missile) 
Shooter’s effective delay (latency) and the smaller the chance of a successful shot: 
this effect is highly nonlinear as potential target input approaches Shooter 
capacity, and thus is a source of important detrimental sensitivity. Certainly 
additions to the target list/queue that are the result of Sensor mistakes (initial 
misclassifications, or incorrect BDA leading to re-targeting of killed Red assets) 
can be seen to have cascading detrimental effects on system effectiveness, 
particularly when the overall system becomes heavily loaded, i.e., as increasingly 
many targets are placed on the Shooter’s list. The model helps identify 
requirements for controlling such bottleneck situations.  
The present model is deterministic/expected-value, although it reflects  
time-dependent stochastic features such as system saturation analytically, using a 
mathematical device; cf. Filipiak (1988). The basic model formulation logic can 
be made to govern a discrete-event simulation if desired, or as the basis for 
probabilistic analysis; see Gaver and Jacobs (1999) for a simplified, but 
• 
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analytically treatable, version. The present modeling technique facilitates quick 
approximate investigations and model browsing for interesting effects.  
2. Example Sensor-Shooter Architectures 
Consider two specific examples of Sensor-Shooter architectures:  
(A) Architecture 1: General Regional Coverage (GRC), Delayed Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA), in which prosecuted (shot-at) targets are released back into their 
present (sub)region for eventual discovery and re-classification by a Regional Sensor 
System, or  
(B) Architecture 2: Local, Quick Follow-up (LQF) and General Regional 
Coverage (GRC), Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), in which a Local Quick  
Follow-up sensor capability exists to immediately assess the results of a shot (but with 
potential error) and the just-targeted Red then re-targeted immediately if judged alive; if 
alive and judged dead it is released for eventual later rediscovery by the GRC (until such 
discovery it is free to engage in hostile acts). Tomahawk, Block 4, has some LQF 
capabilities.  
Both Architectures are represented as generic. It will be the objective of subsequent 
work to characterize the operational capabilities of potential new systems and 
architectures by adjusting the parameters of our model. Then model experimentation can 
be used to suggest specific system investments to best add operational value.  
3. Illustrative Invasion-Strike Scenario 
Figure 1 depicts a region, R, into which Red units are envisioned to pour from the 
North. Their objective is to move Southwards, but perhaps to punctuate the journey with 
occasional hostile actions such as missile (e.g., SCUD) shots.  
The Figure 1 legend describes illustrative prototypical Red units and their general 
states of perception by the Blue ISR. The Red units may be in any of the range bands 
shown: R4 to R1. The types shown here are (1) Heavy Armor Units (Hard Targets) both 
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detected and undetected, and hence on a Blue virtual target list; (2) Light Armor and/or 
Infantry, undetected, but also detected and on the Blue virtual target list; (3) Decoys 
(deliberate) and False Targets (natural/environmental, e.g., civilian non-combatants), 
undetected and also detected and on the Blue virtual target list. These can be both 










= armor unit (undetected & unclassified) 
= armor unit (detected/classified, targetable)  
= light armor and/or infantry (undetected & unclassified) 
= light armor and/or infantry (detected/classified, targetable) 
= decoys or false targets  



















Figure 1  
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4. Flow Charts of Operational Architectures and Blue Perception  
In Figures 2 and 3 we introduce flow charts to describe the general motion of Red 
units between states of concern to the Blue system of systems.  
Figure 2 depicts the state transitions for units under Architecture 1, for which the 
sensor coverage is of the various regions. Note that this coverage may be made variable 
and adaptive, and that detections occur at effective (sweep) rates determined by Blue 
decision makers. Presumably the Blue allocation of detection effort should be made to 
conform to anticipated and predicted Red motion in the region; likewise that Red motion 
can react to perceived Blue sensor presence, which is of analyst-adjustable acuity. The 
model equations (see Appendix I) can be made to represent the various feedbacks that 





























 • All target classification and BDA decisions are error-prone or fallible to 
adjustable degree. Hence the DETECTED REDS target queue contains alive 
targets, and also dead (presumed alive) and dead (unclassified or BDAed)  
Figure 2.  Architecture 1: 
General Regional Coverage Sensors (GRC) (Delayed Shooter BDA) 
Manned a/c have immediate BDA as in Figure 3 
Figure 3 represents state transitions of units governed by Architecture 2. Here we 
augment the GRC capability by an Immediate Shooter BDA capability associated with 
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the missile shooters (only): when a Blue missile is fired at a Red target in Ri the act is 
presumed to be immediately followed by a BDA sensor (possibly on the missile); if (1) a 
Blue miss or failure to kill is registered, an immediate return to the target list is 
scheduled, while (2) if a Blue kill is registered, the target is immediately declared dead 
and new targets are engaged. We model the effects of the several possible errors: in case 
(1) the mistake of registering a miss when a kill actually occurred results in at least one 
wasted shot, while in case (2) the error of mistakenly registering a kill means that the 



































 • All target classification and BDA decisions are error-prone or fallible to 
adjustable degree.  
Figure 3.  Architecture 2: 
GRC and Local Quick Follow-Up (LQF) (Immediate Shooter BDA) 
5. Strike Dynamics  
We present the details of the state variables, rate parameters, and dynamical equations 
in Appendix I. The equations are annotated term by term so that the contribution of each 
term is explained. In broad outline, Reds enter the region, possibly migrating Southwards, 
are detected by Blue sensors in each region (with delay), then placed on a target list (from 
which track losses can occur), are eventually shot at by either missiles (or gunnery) or 
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manned aircraft. Those missed are subject to re-detection (BDA) and reclassification 
(without reference to individual past, except by regional location). The aim is to 
understand the effectiveness of Blue sensor-shooter assets of given force size, 
composition, and effectiveness against a composite Red force.  
Our current formulation is the deterministic equivalent of a continuous-time 
multivariate stochastic Markov process. Such a stochastic process is one attractive 
modeling option, but has not been adopted for reasons of computational economy. Monte 
Carlo simulation has not been adopted here for the same reason. Ample precedent for the 
present style of modeling occurs in ecology, epidemiology, and population biology (see 
Murray (1989)), not to mention early military operations research; see Dockery and 
Woodcock (1993), Taylor (1980), and Anderson (1995). One difference in our model is 
the explicit representation of congestion, particularly possible saturation, of Blue’s 
sensor, communication, and shooter resources. These latter resources are bound to be 
limited, so backlogs (“queues”) effectively develop of Red units that await detection 
(“service”), and subsequently are placed virtually in line for shooter “service.” However, 
that service can be much reduced in effective speed because of the presence of dead, 
misclassified targets, and decoys. Some of these are lost from track, and hence the target 
list. Classical queuing theory, see Kleinrock (1975), leads us to expect that some backlog 
will tend to develop at both the sensor and communication/shooter stages, even when 
demand for service does not exceed service rate at a stage; this is the result of short-term 
random fluctuations in the communications and shooter system. We choose to represent 
the latter effect approximately by modifying a simple mathematical device put forward 
by Agnew (1976) and Rider (1976), more recently discussed by Filipiak (1988). These 
papers introduce the non-linear H-function defined, along with parameters. The 
modification required for sensors has recognized that (a) the sensor “server” must itself 
be multiple (several sensor platforms potentially cover each subregion whose capacities 
are finite and saturable, and (b) must accommodate multiple Red target types and states; 
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the latter is accomplished by proportional processor sharing, and the former by increasing 
effective service (here sweep) rate. The modification for the communication/shooter 
system is the same, but modifies the processor sharing service intensity across the target 
list by priority weighting: wik represents the fraction of time made available to process 
(shoot) targets in region i judged to be of type k; cijk represents the sensor skill, it being 
the probability that a target of type j in region i is believed to be, and treated as of type k, 
where cijj = 1 represents perfect skill.  
Each of the above parameters is treated in the present report as a static  
analyst-decision maker choice: a constant. However, the possibility, and attraction, is 
great to let these “parameters” be replaced by functions, and so be automatically adjusted, 
i.e., governed by feedback from Blue perception of Red states and inferred course of 
action.  
6. Case Study 1: Constant Red Arrival Rate  
We first consider an extremely simple scenario, wherein a constant number of Reds 
per day (500 Hard, 500 Soft) pour into the northernmost region, R4. The basic sensor 
sweep rate is ξ = 5000. We present graphs of the model output, beginning with 
cumulative input and number undetected Figure 4(a) without Blue attrition. The 
subsequent figures appear in Appendix II. Note that in the non-attrited deterministic/fluid 
approximation the cumulative entry level of Red targets is strictly linear, and the 
cumulative number undetected quickly approaches linearity in time.  
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Total Number of Red targets
Constant Input Rate : 500 H tgts, 500 S tgts per day
No Attrition; No loss from track




















Total number of  Reds in region
 
Figure 4(a) 
Case Study 2: Accelerated Red Arrival Rate to a Maximum Number of Reds  
In this case study Reds enter the region at an increasing rate until the number of Hard 
Reds that enter reaches 30,000 and the number of Soft Reds that enter reaches 10,000. 
The number of Hard Reds that enter the region by time t is (100)t2/2 for t ≤ 24.5 and 
30,000 for t ≥ 24.5; the number of Soft Reds that enter the region by time t is (100)t2/2 
for t ≤ 14.1 and 10,000 for t ≥ 14.1. Figure 5(a) displays the assumed arrival of Red 
targets into region R and the number undetected for the basic sensor sweep rate  
ξ = 9,000.  
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Number Live Targets
No Attrition ; No loss from track
 Accel: 100 H tgts, 100 S tgts per day  
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Tabled Results  
The tables below and on the following page summarize various model combat 
outcomes of interest at t = 25 and t = 50 (days). One can see at a glance the effect of the 
presumed system architectures and parameters. More detailed graphical presentations are 
also possible. They are presented and discussed in Appendix II.  
TABLE 6.1 
Summary of Combat Outcomes  
(Measures of Effectiveness) 
Combat Duration = 25 days 
Linear Input 
Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II
Number Undetected
Latency= 1 hr 1.06E+04 8.87E+03 8.33E+03 5.17E+03 3.55E+03 3.51E+03 2.87E+02 2.73E+02
Latency= 0.5 hr 1.51E+03 3.66E+02 3.68E+02 2.31E+02 1.50E+02 1.29E+02 1.07E+01 6.40E+00
Number weapons
expended
Latency= 1 hr 5.23E+04 4.89E+04 5.43E+04 4.95E+04 3.92E+04 3.92E+04 3.47E+04 3.47E+04
Latency= 0.5 hr 9.05E+04 7.08E+04 8.38E+04 5.89E+04 4.70E+04 4.70E+04 3.54E+04 3.54E+04
Number Reds killed 
(out of 2.50E+04)
Latency= 1 hr 1.42E+04 1.60E+04 1.65E+04 1.97E+04 2.12E+04 2.12E+04 2.46E+04 2.46E+04
Latency=  0.5 hr 2.34E+04 2.46E+04 2.46E+04 2.47E+04 2.48E+04 2.48E+04 2.50E+04 2.50E+04
Number weapons 
expended per target 
killed
Latency= 1 hr 3.68E+00 3.04E+00 3.29E+00 2.51E+00 1.85E+00 1.85E+00 1.41E+00 1.41E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 3.86E+00 2.88E+00 3.41E+00 2.38E+00 1.90E+00 1.90E+00 1.42E+00 1.42E+00
Number erroneous
weapons expended
Latency= 1 hr 3.27E+04 2.93E+04 1.55E+04 1.09E+04 1.93E+04 1.93E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 5.66E+04 4.11E+04 2.44E+04 1.19E+04 2.32E+04 2.31E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Number Blue Aircraft
Killed (out of 100)
Latency=  1 hr 7.74E+00 6.33E+00 6.11E+00 3.60E+00 2.90E+00 2.89E+00 5.54E-01 5.54E-01
Latency=  0.5 hr 1.40E+00 6.01E-01 5.68E-01 3.93E-01 3.08E-01 3.07E-01 3.75E-02 3.25E-02
Number Red
Weapons Expended
Latency=  1 hr 2.69E+03 2.20E+03 2.12E+03 1.26E+03 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 1.89E+02 1.88E+02
Latency=  0.5 hr 4.81E+02 2.00E+02 1.93E+02 1.31E+02 1.05E+02 1.04E+02 1.28E+01 1.11E+01
C=0.5; BDA=0.5 C=1.0; BDA=0.5 C=0.5; BDA=1.0 C=1.0; BDA=1.0
 
Parametric Values  
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts, 500 S tgts per day 
pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters 
Time until tracked target loss=1 hr. 
100 aircraft; 1 hr. on station; 11 hrs. off station 
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TABLE 6.2 
Summary of Combat Outcomes  
(Measures of Effectiveness) 
Combat Duration = 50 days 
Linear Input 
Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II
Number Undetected
Latency= 1 hr 2.19E+04 1.88E+04 1.72E+04 1.17E+04 7.47E+03 7.42E+03 2.88E+02 2.74E+02
Latency= 0.5 hr 2.79E+03 3.67E+02 3.68E+02 2.32E+02 1.51E+02 1.29E+02 1.07E+01 6.41E+00
Number weapons
expended
Latency= 1 hr 1.03E+05 9.75E+04 1.07E+05 1.00E+05 7.82E+04 7.83E+04 7.00E+04 7.00E+04
Latency= 0.5 hr 1.83E+05 1.43E+05 1.69E+05 1.19E+05 9.45E+04 9.45E+04 7.08E+04 7.08E+04
Number Reds killed 
(out of 5.00E+04)
Latency= 1 hr 2.79E+04 3.10E+04 3.26E+04 3.81E+04 4.22E+04 4.23E+04 4.96E+04 4.96E+04
Latency=  0.5 hr 4.71E+04 4.96E+04 4.96E+04 4.97E+04 4.98E+04 4.98E+04 5.00E+04 5.00E+04
Number weapons 
expended per target 
killed
Latency= 1 hr 3.69E+00 3.14E+00 3.28E+00 2.62E+00 1.85E+00 1.85E+00 1.41E+00 1.41E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 3.89E+00 2.88E+00 3.40E+00 2.39E+00 1.90E+00 1.90E+00 1.42E+00 1.42E+00
Number erroneous
weapons expended
Latency= 1 hr 6.43E+04 5.88E+04 3.07E+04 2.33E+04 3.85E+04 3.85E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 1.14E+05 8.30E+04 4.94E+04 2.40E+04 4.65E+04 4.65E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Number Blue Aircraft
Killed (out of 100)
Latency=  1 hr 3.26E+01 2.75E+01 2.57E+01 1.66E+01 1.16E+01 1.16E+01 1.16E+00 1.15E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 4.78E+00 1.23E+00 1.19E+00 8.07E-01 6.42E-01 6.38E-01 7.70E-02 6.70E-02
Number Red
Weapons Expended
Latency=  1 hr 1.09E+04 9.17E+03 8.56E+03 5.52E+03 3.88E+03 3.88E+03 3.85E+02 3.85E+02
Latency=  0.5 hr 1.59E+03 4.10E+02 3.96E+02 2.69E+02 2.14E+02 2.13E+02 2.56E+01 2.23E+01
C=0.5; BDA=0.5 C=1.0; BDA=0.5 C=0.5; BDA=1.0 C=1.0; BDA=1.0
 
Parametric Values  
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts, 500 S tgts per day 
pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters  
Time until tracked target is lost=1 hr. 
100 aircraft; 1 hr. on station; 11 hrs. off station 
Discussion of Tables 6.1 and 6.2  
If target classification and BDA are perfect, then both Architectures result in the 
attrition of most of the Red targets for both shooter latencies. When the shooter latency 
time is 0.5 hour there is little difference in attrition for the two Architectures if either the 
probability of correct target classification or the probability of correct BDA is equal to 1. 
If the shooter latency is 1 hour, then more targets are attrited when one increases the 
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probability of correct BDA from 0.5 to 1, than if the probability of correct classification 
is increased from 0.5 to 1.  
More weapons are expended for the case of the probability of correct classification 
equal to 1 and probability of correct BDA is 0.5, than the case in which the probability of 
correct classification is equal to 0.5 and the probability of correct BDA is 1.  
If the shooter latency is 1 hour and the probability of correct BDA and probability of 
correct classification is 0.5, then decreasing the shooter latency to 0.5 hour results in 
greater attrition than increasing either probability by itself. However, this improvement is 
at the expense of greater weapon expenditure per target killed.  
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TABLE 6.3 
Summary of Combat Outcomes  
(Measures of Effectiveness) 
Combat Duration = 25 days 
For accelerated input to a max of 3E4 Hard targets and 1E4 Soft targets 
Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II
Number Undetected
Latency= 1 hr 2.37E+04 2.86E+04 2.37E+04 2.04E+04 2.13E+04 2.12E+04 1.43E+04 1.43E+04
Latency= 0.5 hr 1.89E+04 1.68E+04 1.37E+04 9.88E+03 1.13E+04 1.12E+04 4.63E+02 4.27E+02
Number weapons
expended
Latency= 1 hr 4.09E+04 4.30E+04 5.16E+04 4.45E+04 3.55E+04 3.55E+04 3.57E+04 3.57E+04
Latency= 0.5 hr 8.06E+04 7.16E+04 8.54E+04 7.31E+04 5.81E+04 5.82E+04 5.60E+04 5.60E+04
Number Reds killed 
(out of 4.00E+04)
Latency= 1 hr 1.59E+04 1.14E+04 1.60E+04 1.93E+04 1.81E+04 1.81E+04 2.52E+04 2.52E+04
Latency=  0.5 hr 2.09E+04 2.29E+04 2.61E+04 2.99E+04 2.82E+04 2.82E+04 3.93E+04 3.93E+04
Number weapons 
expended per target 
killed
Latency= 1 hr 2.57E+00 3.77E+00 3.23E+00 2.31E+00 1.96E+00 1.96E+00 1.46E+00 1.46E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 3.86E+00 3.12E+00 3.27E+00 2.44E+00 2.06E+00 2.06E+00 1.42E+00 1.42E+00
Number erroneous
weapons expended
Latency= 1 hr 2.23E+04 2.65E+04 1.44E+04 8.59E+03 1.70E+04 1.70E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 4.93E+04 4.13E+04 2.42E+04 1.53E+04 2.82E+04 2.82E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Number Blue Aircraft
Killed (out of 100)
Latency=  1 hr 1.28E+01 1.62E+01 1.33E+01 1.10E+01 1.14E+01 1.14E+01 8.16E+00 8.15E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 9.92E+00 8.42E+00 7.58E+00 5.30E+00 5.67E+00 5.67E+00 1.34E+00 1.33E+00
Number Red
Weapons Expended
Latency=  1 hr 4.52E+03 5.68E+03 4.66E+03 3.87E+03 4.02E+03 4.02E+03 2.87E+03 3.00E+02
Latency=  0.5 hr 3.50E+03 2.98E+03 2.67E+03 1.87E+03 2.01E+03 2.01E+03 4.53E+02 1.37E+01
C=0.5; BDA=0.5 C=1.0; BDA=0.5 C=0.5; BDA=1.0 C=1.0; BDA=1.0
 
Parametric Values  
Accelerated Input Rate: 100 H tgts, 100 S tgts per day 
to maximum of 30K H tgts and 10K S tgts 
pH|H=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters  
Time until tracked target is lost=1 hr. 
100 aircraft; 1 hr. on station; 11 hrs. off station 
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TABLE 6.4 
Summary of Combat Outcomes  
(Measures of Effectiveness) 
Combat Duration = 50 days 
For accelerated input to a max of 3E4 Hard targets and 1E4 Soft targets 
Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II Arch. I Arch II
Number Undetected
Latency= 1 hr 1.67E+04 1.90E+04 1.62E+04 1.22E+04 1.34E+04 1.34E+04 1.42E+03 1.39E+03
Latency= 0.5 hr 8.91E+03 6.38E+03 3.23E+02 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Number weapons
expended
Latency= 1 hr 6.16E+04 8.30E+04 7.80E+04 6.96E+04 5.38E+04 5.38E+04 5.44E+04 5.44E+04
Latency= 0.5 hr 1.25E+05 1.14E+05 1.35E+05 1.02E+05 8.66E+04 8.66E+04 5.70E+04 5.70E+04
Number Reds killed 
(out of 4.00E+04)
Latency= 1 hr 2.30E+04 2.10E+04 2.37E+04 2.77E+04 2.63E+04 2.63E+04 3.83E+04 3.83E+04
Latency=  0.5 hr 3.09E+04 3.35E+04 3.96E+04 4.00E+04 4.00E+04 4.00E+04 4.00E+04 4.00E+04
Number weapons 
expended per target 
killed
Latency= 1 hr 2.68E+00 3.95E+00 3.29E+00 2.51E+00 2.05E+00 2.05E+00 1.42E+00 1.42E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 4.04E+00 3.40E+00 3.41E+00 2.55E+00 2.17E+00 2.17E+00 1.43E+00 1.43E+00
Number erroneous
weapons expended
Latency= 1 hr 3.36E+04 4.73E+04 2.24E+04 1.16E+04 2.58E+04 2.58E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Latency=  0.5 hr 7.67E+04 6.68E+04 3.94E+04 2.24E+04 4.20E+04 4.20E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Number Blue Aircraft
Killed (out of 100)
Latency=  1 hr 4.40E+01 5.19E+01 4.38E+01 3.60E+01 3.83E+01 3.84E+01 2.06E+01 2.06E+01
Latency=  0.5 hr 3.11E+01 2.63E+01 1.83E+01 1.03E+01 1.31E+01 1.31E+01 1.37E+00 1.36E+00
Number Red
Weapons Expended
Latency=  1 hr 1.47E+04 1.73E+04 1.46E+04 1.20E+04 1.28E+04 1.28E+04 6.86E+03 6.86E+03
Latency=  0.5 hr 1.04E+04 8.76E+03 6.09E+03 3.42E+03 4.36E+03 4.36E+03 4.57E+02 4.55E+02
C=0.5; BDA=0.5 C=1.0; BDA=0.5 C=0.5; BDA=1.0 C=1.0; BDA=1.0
 
Parametric Values  
Accelerated Input Rate: 100 H tgts, 100 S tgts per day 
to maximum of 30K H tgts and 10K S tgts 
pH|H=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters  
Time until tracked target is lost=1 hr. 
100 aircraft; 1 hr. on station; 11 hrs. off station 
Discussion of Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
If the shooter latency is 1 hour and the probabilities of correct classification and 
correct BDA are all 0.5, then decreasing the shooter latency to 0.5 hour results in greater 
attrition than increasing either the probabilities of correct classification or probabilities of 
correct BDA to 1. However, decreasing the latency to 0.5 hour results in a larger number 
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of weapons required for every target killed, while increasing the probabilities of correct 
classification (respectively the probabilities of correct BDA) to 1 results in fewer 
weapons required for every target killed. Increasing the probabilities of correct BDA 
results in the smallest number of weapons per target killed.  
If the probabilities of correct BDA are equal to 1, both Architectures result in the 
same number of kills and number of weapons per kill. The number of targets killed and 
number of weapons expended per kill are smallest when the probabilities of correct BDA 
are equal to 1.  
Tables 6.5 – 6.7 present further results concerning the scenario with linear input.  
TABLE 6.5 
Summary of Combat Outcomes 
Linear Input 
C=0.5, BDA=0.5 
 Sensor Rate=2500 
Combat Duration=25 
days 
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Discussion of Table 6.5 
Table 6.5 presents results for total number of weapons expended, the number of 
erroneous weapons expended, the number of Reds killed, and the number of weapons 
expended per target killed for two shooter latencies (1 hour and 0.5 hour) and two 
19 
regional sensor rates (ξ=5000 and ξ=2500). The probabilities of correct classification and 
the probabilities of correct BDA are 0.5.  
First consider a shooter latency of 1 hour. Note that Architecture 1 has more kills 
when the regional sensor rate is smaller (2500) than for the larger (5000) sensor rate. 
Recall that for Architecture 1 the regional sensor is providing all of the BDA. Dead 
targets that are (mis)classified as live by the regional sensor are returned to the targeting 
list for further action. The larger sensor rate is increasing the rate at which these 
misclassified dead targets are returned to the targeting list. These misclassified dead 
targets decrease the amount of effort the shooters devotes to the live targets on the list. 
Additionally, for Architecture 1 the slower sensor rate results in fewer expended weapons 
per target killed than the higher sensor rate. Recall that Architecture 2 has additional 
immediate BDA capability. In this case the larger regional sensor rate results in the 
removal of more misclassified dead targets resulting from the immediate BDA from the 
targeting list than that resulting from the slower regional sensor rate. Thus, Architecture 2 
has more Red targets killed for the faster regional sensor rate than for the slower regional 
sensor rate. Further, the faster sensor rate results in fewer weapons expended per target 
killed than the slower sensor rate. 
Next consider a shooter latency of 0.5 hour. The shorter shooter latency allows 
Architecture 1 to prosecute more misclassified dead targets in addition to the live targets 
on the targeting list. Thus, the number of targets killed for Architecture 1 is greater for 
the larger sensor rate than the smaller sensor rate. However, the number of weapons 
expended per killed target is also greater for the faster sensor rate than the slower sensor 
rate. The smaller shooter latency results in fewer misclassified dead targets being 
removed by the regional sensor from the target list in Architecture 2. However, 
Architecture 2 still has a slightly larger number of targets killed for the larger sensor rate. 
Further, the faster sensor rate results in fewer weapons expended per target killed than the 
slower sensor rate. 
20 
For Architecture 1, the larger sensor rate results in more weapons expended per target 
killed for a shooter latency of 0.5 hour as compared to that for a shooter latency of 1 
hour. For Architecture 2, the larger sensor rate results in fewer weapons expended per 
target killed for a shooter latency of 0.5 hour as compared to that for a shooter latency of 
1 hour. For Architecture 1, the smaller sensor rate results in more weapons expended per 
target killed for a shooter latency of 0.5 hour as compared to that for a shooter latency of 
1 hour. For Architecture 2, the smaller sensor rate results in more weapons expended per 
target killed for a shooter latency of 0.5 hour as compared to that for a shooter latency of 
1 hour.  
TABLE 6.6 
Summary of Combat Outcomes 
Linear Input 
C=1.0, BDA=0.5 
 Sensor Rate=2500 
Combat Duration=25 
days 
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Discussion of Table 6.6 
Table 6.6 presents results for the case in which there is perfect target classification 
and the probabilities of correct BDA are 0.5. Perfect target classification implies that the 
most efficient weapon is expended on each target type, resulting in fewer weapons 
expended per target killed than if target classification were not perfect.  
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For Architecture 1, the regional sensor is performing all the BDA. If the regional 
sensor misclassifies a dead target as live, the dead target is placed on the targeting list for 
further prosecution. A larger regional sensor rate hastens the placement of misclassified 
dead targets to the targeting list. For a shooter latency of 1 hour, the number of targets 
killed using Architecture 1 for both regional sensor rates are equal. However, the number 
of weapons expended per target killed is larger for the higher regional sensor rate than for 
the smaller sensor rate. For the shorter shooter latency of 0.5 hours, the number of targets 
killed is slightly less for the higher regional sensor rate than the lower sensor rate. The 
number of weapons expended per target killed is less for the smaller sensor rate than the 
larger sensor rate. 
Architecture 2 has immediate BDA capability in addition to the regional sensor BDA. 
The regional sensor can remove dead targets that have been misclassified by the 
immediate BDA capability from the targeting list. For the shooter latency of 1 hour, the 
number of targets killed using Architecture 2 is greater for the higher regional sensor rate 
than the lower one. The number of weapons expended per killed target for the higher 
sensor rate is less than that for the smaller sensor rate. For the shooter latency of 0.5 
hours, the number of targets killed is about the same for both regional sensor rates. 
However, the number of weapons expended per target killed is less for the larger regional 
sensor rate than the smaller sensor rate.  
For Architecture 1, the shorter shooter latency results in more weapons expended per 
target killed than the larger shooter latency. For Architecture 2, the shorter shooter 
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Discussion of Table 6.7  
Table 6.7 presents results for the case in which the BDA is perfect and the 
probabilities of correct target classification are 0.5. For the particular scenario being 
considered, the main effect of target misclassification is to reduce the probability of 
killing a hard target when the hard target is misclassified as soft. Since the BDA is 
perfect, the perfect BDA will inform the shooters that a missed target is alive and that 
target will be re-targeted. The difference between Architectures 1 and 2 in this case is 
when the BDA information becomes available. Architecture 1 has all of its BDA done by 
the regional sensors. As a result, the outcome of the BDA is delayed. The additional 
immediate BDA capability of Architecture 2 implies that the result of BDA is known 
instantaneously. Thus, missed targets are always available for re-targeting with 
Architecture 2. Missed targets are available for re-targeting after a delay in 
Architecture 1.  
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper describes and exploits a low-resolution, high-level modeling methodology 
for the study of the effectiveness of a system of systems. The methodology facilitates 
quick turnaround efficient exploration of sensitivities of measures of Blue combat 
success to realistically imperfect Blue ISR and IW capabilities: limited and imperfect 
sensor surveillance and reconnaissance, particularly BDA, and finite, hence saturable, 
communications and weapons delivery capability. The model explicitly, but purposefully 
skeletally, represents aircraft sorties, fires, sensor/shooter latencies, target losses, 
imperfect target type classification, imperfect weapon assignment, and BDA. The model 
is deterministic/expected value or “fluid” in style, although it represents time-dependent, 
non-linear stochastic features such as system saturability by means of an analytical 
device.  
The methodology is illustrated by the comparison of two sensor-shooter architectures 
in a strike scenario. In Architecture 1, battle damage assessment is performed by regional 
sensors, and is delayed. In Architecture 2, an additional capability of immediate BDA is 
added to that of regional sensors. Model experimentation suggests the following 
conclusions. 
• Decreasing the Blue sensor/shooter latency can result in greater Red attrition than 
increasing the probabilities of correct target classification and BDA. However, the 
improvement is at the expense of greater weapon expenditure per target killed. 
• One possible effect of erroneous BDA is to return dead targets to the shooter 
targeting list. These dead targets require shooter resources, and so decrease the 
amount of effort the shooters devote to live targets.  Thus, dead targets that are 
returned to the targeting list not only result in wasted weapon expenditure but also 
in additional delay to prosecute live targets. The re-attacks may actually place 
manned aircraft at extra risk; see Table 6.2. A dead target returned to the targeting 
list through erroneous BDA has a similar effect to that of a decoy. If the shooter 
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latency is long, then increasing the probability of correct BDA can result in more 
targets being killed than increasing the probability of correct target classification.  
• It is important to balance the resources of the sensors and the shooters. If the BDA 
is imperfect, then myopically increasing the regional sensor rate can undesirably 
increase the number of dead targets that are erroneously returned to the targeting 
list. If the shooter latency is large, then resources erroneously allocated to the 
dead targets on the targeting list result in more live targets being lost before a 
weapon reaches them. Thus, for Architecture 1, the effect of the increase in sensor 
detection rate can be a decrease in the number of targets killed during a time 
period; see Table 6.5.  
• The effect of the additional immediate BDA capability of Architecture 2 depends 
on the regional sensor rate. The regional sensor can remove dead targets from the 
targeting list that have been placed there by erroneous instantaneous BDA. Thus, 
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APPENDIX I 
In this appendix all mathematical development is recorded.  
A1. State Variables 
Below are listed the state variables that describe the system at any time t:  
Rij(t) = Number of detected, hence targetable, alive Reds that are of type j in 
(sub)region i at time t. Note: j can denote a false target or decoy (which 
includes those previously targeted, missed and incorrectly left for dead).  
R tij b g  = Number of alive Reds undetected of type j that are in (sub)region i at time t. 
Note: these include some of those previously targeted.  
Mij(t) = Number of dead Red targets of type j in (sub)region i unclassified at time t 
(required in Architecture Model 1; BDA classifies these (possibly 
incorrectly)).  
Dij(t) = Number of dead Red targets of type j in (sub)region i that are still counted as 
alive at time t.  
Kij(t) = Number of Red targets of type j in (sub)region i killed during (0, t]. 
Si(•,t) = Sensor effort “looking” at (sub)region i at time t. The • indicates that this may 
be modified by Blue in accordance with perceived Red state conditions.  
Bi(•,t) = Number of Blue (missile) Shooters prosecuting targets in (sub)region i at time 
t. Again, the dot • signifies possible feedback-driven or scripted shooter 
allocations.  
Ai(•,t) = Number of aircraft in region i at time t. Same comment concerning •.  
A ta f  = Number of live aircraft at time t.  
Wij(t) = Number of Weapons expended by non-aircraft assets in (sub)region i at targets 
perceived to be of type j during [0, t].  
Wij(a;t) = Number of Weapons expended by aircraft assets in (sub)region i at targets 
perceived to be of type j during [0, t].  
Wij(d;t) = Number of Weapons expended all assets in (sub)region i at dead targets of type 
j perceived to be alive during [0, t].  




R t R ti
j
• = ∑a f a fij
ij
; total number of undetected Red targets in (sub)region i at time t.  
D t D ti
j
• = ∑a f a f; total number of dead Red targets in (sub)region i that are perceived to 
be alive at time t. 
Next there follows a listing of current parameters that enter the equations for state 
development. These are initially constants, but may be made time, or state dependent; in 
the latter case dynamic adaptation can be modeled.  
A2. Parameters  
The following parameters are required to specify the dynamic evolution of the 
process of states: 
ξi = (sweep) rate at which Red targets are processed by one sensor system in 
(sub)region i; this can be generalized to account for different sensor types, but 
has not been.  
νij = rate at which Red targets of type j are lost by the sensor system in (sub)region 
i.  
αij = rate at which Red targets of type j in (sub)region i are active (shoot) and are 
detected by Blue.  
αij(a) = probability a Red target of type j is detected while firing at a Blue aircraft  
pikj(a) = probability a target of type j in (sub)region i is killed by a Blue aircraft when 
the Blue aircraft is targeting it as a type k target.  
pj(R,B) = probability a Red of type j kills a Blue aircraft.  
cijk(a;a) = probability an alive Red target of type j in (sub)region i is classified as a type 
k when it is being prosecuted by a Blue aircraft.  
cijk(d;a) = probability a dead Red target of type j in (sub)region i that is perceived to be 
alive is classified as a type k when it is being prosecuted by a Blue aircraft. 
µi = rate at which a detected Red target in (sub)region i is prosecuted by a shooter.  
wik = fraction of a Blue shooter’s effort that is used to prosecute targets of type k in 
(sub)region i.  
wik(a) = fraction of a Blue aircraft’s effort in (sub)region i that is used to prosecute 
targets of type k.  
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cijk(a) = probability an alive Red target of type j in (sub)region i is classified as a type 
k when it is being prosecuted by a Blue shooter.  
cijk(d) = probability a dead Red target of type j in (sub)region i that is not perceived to 
be dead is classified as a type k when it is being prosecuted by a Blue shooter.  
mij(d) = probability a dead target of type j in (sub)region i is declared dead by the field 
sensor system.  
mij(a) = probability a live target of type j in (sub)region i is declared live by the field 
sensor system.  
pikj = probability a target of type j in (sub)region i is killed by a Blue shooter when 
the Blue shooter is targeting it as a type k target.  
rikj(d|a) = probability a live target of type j in (sub)region i that has been prosecuted by 
Blue shooters as a type k and is still alive, but is classified as dead by the 
shooter sensor system; rikj(a|a) = 1 – rikj(d|a).  
rikj(d|d) = probability a dead target of type j in (sub)region i that has been prosecuted by 
Blue shooters as a type k is classified as dead by the shooter sensor system; 
rikj(a|d) = 1 – rikj(d|d). 
rikj(d|d;a) = probability a dead target of type j in (sub)region i that has been prosecuted 
by Blue aircraft as a type k is classified as dead by the aircraft; rikj(a|d;a) = 
1 – rikj(d|d;a).  
rikj(d|a;a) = probability a live target of type j in (sub)region i that has been prosecuted by 
Blue aircraft as a type k is still alive, but is classified as dead by the aircraft; 
rikj(a|a;a) = 1 – rikj(d|a;a).  
1/βi(a) = mean on-station time for an aircraft in (sub)region i.  
1/ρi(a) = mean time between an aircraft’s departure from region i and its next arrival.  
δij(R,B) = rate of fire at a Blue aircraft by a Red of type j in (sub)region i.  
δi(B,R) = rate of fire at a Red target by a Blue aircraft in (sub)region i.  
λij = arrival rate of targets of type j into (sub)region i from outside the region.  
γ i jA  = rate at which a target of type j in (sub)region i moves into (sub)region A.  
H(x) = amount of effort each server expends when there are x customers waiting or 
being served; H(x) = x/(1 + x). See Filipiak (1988), and Gaver, Jacobs, and 
Youngren (1998).  
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A.3 Architecture I (Deferred BDA): Model Defender Dynamics  
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dt
H R t R t D t M t
S t R t m a




i i i i i
i ij ij




b g b g
b g b g b g b gc h b g b g b gb g b g b g b g
b g
Rate of change of
undetected Red,




















− + + + + + +
+
• • • •
• • • •
λ
ξ















i i i i
ik ij ijk ikj
i ik
ij ij
R t R t R t
H R t D t B t
w R t c a p












b g b g b gd i






(detected becomes undetected if
 leave  in which detected)
"Attrition": an alive Red target is missed









Detection from Red firing at aircraft
"Attrition": a miss by Blue aircraft and misclassification as dead
b g
b gc h b g
b g b g b gb g b g b g b gd i c h
	 





+ + + −• •∑
α δ
δ







a R B I A t R t
B R A t w a
R t
R t D t
c a a p a r d a a











H R t R t D t M t S t R t m a
R t R t D t M t
R t R t
H R
ij
i i i i i
i ij ij
i i i i





a f a f a f a fc h a f a f a fa f a f a f a f
a f a f
Rate of change
of detected Red, 
type , in 
Sensor detection Undetected Red, type 
Detected lost







  	 

	 




= + + + + + +
− −
−
• • • •











ij ij i ij
i i ik
ij
t D t B t w R t c a
R t D t
R t
a R B I A t R t










∑a f a fb g a f a fa f a f a f
a fb g a f
a f a f a f
a fc h
( )
( ) ( , )
( , )
.
"Attrition" Red detected dead disappear, alive join 
Detection from
Red action


















∑ R t D t c a a p a p a r d a ai i ijk ikj ikj ikjk a f a f a f a f a fb g b; ;1







H R t D t B t
w R t c a p
R t D t
H R R D M S t
M t
R t R t D t M t
ij
i i i i
ik ij ijk ikj
i ik
i i i i i i
ij
i i i i
j
j
b g b g b gc h b g b g b gb g b g
c h b g b gb g b g b g b g
Rate change
unclassif. dead
 Red, type , in 
"Attrition": Alive Red, type , killed in i





  	 

= + +
− + + + + + +
• •
• •
• • • •





i i i i
ik ij ijk
i ik
H R t D t B t
w D t c d
R t D t
b g
c h
b g b gc h b g b g b gb g b g
 declared dead and ignored after; 
with prob. 1  declared alive and retargeted) 
Shot at ("Attrition" of) Red dead,
misclassif. as alive, and retargeted in i
−











H R t R t D t M t S t
M t m d
R t R t D t M t
H R t D t B t
w
ij
i i i i i i
ij ij
i i i i




b g b g b g b g b gc h b g b g b gc hb g b g b g b g
b g b gc h b g
Rate change dead
Red, type , class.
as live in 
Sensor detection of unclassified dead Red,





  	 

= + + + −+ + +
− +
• • • •





D t c d
R t D t
B R A t w a
D t
R t D t
c d a r d d a












b g b g
b g b g
b g b g b gb g b g b g c h











"Attrition" of dead, classified as alive Red,type , in 














b g b g b g b g c h0 01. ; ;+ +• •∑ R t D t c a a p a r a d ai i ijk ikj ijkk







a A t R B R t R t p R B I A t
a I A t A t
R t
R t
A t A t
i







b g b g b g b g b g b gc h b g b gc h
b g b g b gc hd i b gb g b g b g
= − − + >







on site Attrition of Blue by Red
Arrival rate of aircraft to i
 	 












R B R t R t p R B I A tij ij ij j
ji
i
a f a f a f a fc h a f a fb= − + >∑∑ δ , ,
Attrition of Blue aircraft by Red
 	 

g0   
 dW t
dt
H R t D t B t w R t c a D t c d
R t D t
ij
i i i i ij
ik ikj ik ikj
i ik
a f a f a fb g a f a f a f a f a fa f a f= +
+
+• • • •∑µ   
 dW t a
dt
B R A t w a R t c a a D t c d a
R t D t
ij
i i ij




a f a f a f a f a f a f a f a fa f a f=
;+




H R t D t B t
w D t c d
R t D t
B R A t w a
D t


















b g b g b gc h b g b g b gb g b g
b g b g b gb g b g b g
Rate change wpns fired
at dead
Red, type ,  class.
as live in 
"Attrition" of dead,  classified as alive Red,type ,  in 





















H R t D t B t
w R t c a p
R t D t
B R A t w a
R t
R t D t
c a a p a
ij
i
i i i i









b g b g b gc h b g b gb g b g
b g b g b gb g b g b g b g
b gc hRate of changeof dead Red, 
type , in 
"Attrition" Red detected dead disappear, alive join 
"Attrition" by Blue aircraft
R
	
























H R t R t D t S t
R t m a











a f a f a f
a f a f a fc h a f a f a fa f a f a f
a f
Rate of change of
undetected Red,
type , in i
Migration
into i Migration undet.Red into i






























i i i i
ik ij ijk ikj ikj
i ik
ij ij ij ij
R t R t
H R t D t B t
w R t c a p r d a
R t D t
R t a
a f a f





















Migration detected into ; becomes
undetected upon transit
"Attrition": a miss; alive classif. dead









( ) (R B I A t R t
B R A t w a
R t
R t D t












a fb g a f
a f a f a fa f a f a f a fb g a f
>




Detection from Red firing at aircraft








Multi-Region, Multitype Targets  
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Architecture I: Delayed BDA 
Constant Input Rate : 500 H tgts, 500 S tgts per day
pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr.

























4(b) With 100 (missile) shooters having basic latency of 1 hour, allowing attacks by 
100 aircraft, and using Architecture 1, the number of undetected targets (b-1) remains 
about 0 if all classification and BDA capabilities are perfect (100%), but (b-2) continue to 
grow if classification and BDA skills both drop to 50%. In a tradeoff between (b-3) 
perfect classification and 50% BDA, or (b-4) 50% classification and perfect BDA, the 
latter is the more effective. But the system cannot control the number of undetected 
targets, which grows nearly linearly.  
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Number undetected tgts
Architecture I: Delayed BDA 
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts, 500 S tgts per day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=0.50 hr.



























4(c) Reducing latency to 0.5 hour from 1 hour improves/reduces the undetected target 
backlog considerably when classification and BDA are imperfect: (c-1) if classification 
and BDA skills are 50% then undetected backlog continues to increase, but at ~ 10% the 
rate obtained when latency is 1 hour; (c-2) if probability of correct classification is 
increased to 100%, but BDA is 50% then the backlog quickly reaches a steady-state 
value of around 400; if (c-3) classification skill if 50% while BDA is 100% that  
steady-state backlog is ~ 200, and (c-4) if both skills are 100% then there is virtually no 
backlog. Clearly the latency has a powerful effect on this measure of total system 
capability. 
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Total Number of Wpns shot
Architecture I: Delayed BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts / day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr.




























4(d) If latency is 1 hour then in all cases the total number of weapons expended/shot 
increases nearly linearly in time, but at considerably different rates. (d-1) For perfect 
(100%) classification and BDA the number after 50 days is ~ 70,000. (d-2) For perfect 
(100%) classification and 50% BDA the number after 50 days is ~ 110,000, an increase 
of nearly 60%, while (d-3) if classification is 100% and BDA is 50% the corresponding 
number of shots is ~ 80,000. (d-4) If both classification and BDA are at the 50% level the 
number of shots is ~ 100,000. Consequently, if the system is initially operating at the 
classification 50%, BDA 50% level, by far the greatest payoff is increasing BDA.  
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Total Number of Wpns shot
Architecture I: Delayed BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts / day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=0.50 hr.




























4(e) Suppose latency is reduced to 0.5 hour. The pattern of (d) above is qualitatively 
followed in the same order, but the total number of weapons expended is much greater 
case by case. It remains preferable to improve BDA than to improve classification 
capability, starting them both at the 50% level.  
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Total number tgts killed
Architecture I: Delayed BDA
Constant Input Rate : 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts per day
Activity rate=0.02; pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr. 

























4(f) Consider the cumulative number killed if latency is 1 hour. Here 50,000 Red 
targets are killed after 50 days if classification and BDA are both perfect (100%). If both 
are 50% capable this number drops to ~ 28,000; if classification improves to 100%, with 
BDA still 50% the number killed increases to ~ 33,000, while if classification remains at 
50%, but BDA increases to perfection (100%), the number killed by time 50 increases to 
~ 43,000. Once again the relative advantage of increasing BDA is suggested.  
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Total number tgts killed
Architecture I: Delayed BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts per day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=0.5 hr. 

























4(g) Next let latency be reduced to 0.5 hour. Then all degrees of classification-BDA 
quality (examined) are essentially equivalent, achieving 50,000 kills after 50 days. Of 
course, the choice to improve BDA from 50% (along with 50% classification) obtains 
this kill rate far more economically than do the other choices.  
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Number of erroneous Wpns shot 
Architecture I: Delayed BDA
Constant Input Rate : 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts per day
pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr. 




























4(h) For latency of 1 hour we see that the number of erroneous weapons fired 
increases almost linearly. Erroneous here includes Soft target weapons fired at Hard 
targets (minimal effect), Hard target weapons fired at Soft targets (maximal expense, and 
in some cases small, direct effect) and weapons fired at dead targets. (h-1) For perfect 
classification and BDA there are no errors; however, (h-2) for 50% capability for both 
classification and BDA the total number reaches ~ 60,000. (h-3) If probability of correct 
classification is 50%, but BDA is improved to perfect (100%), the expenditure drops to  
~ 40,000, while (h-4) if classification increases to perfection (100%), and BDA remains 
at 50%, the erroneous shots expended fall to ~ 17,000. Thus, this measure is, in this case, 
actually improved more by increasing classification capability than by improving BDA.  
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Number of erroneous Wpns shot 
Architecture I: Delayed BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=0.50 hr. 




























4(i) For latency of 0.5 hour the number of erroneous weapons fired tends to increase 
linearly, but more rapidly, from case to case because of the increased raw shooting rate. 
In this case as well, it seems functionally better to improve classification than BDA.  
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Number of Red Wpns Expended
Architecture I: Delayed BDA
Constant Input Rate:  500 H tgts; 500 S tgts/day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr.
































4(j) With latency of 1 hour there is dramatic reduction in Red weapons fired by 
improving BDA (50% to 100%, classification at 50%) instead of improving classification 
(from 50% to 100%, BDA at 50%).  
46 
Number of Red Wpns Expended
Architecture I: Delayed BDA
Constant Input Rate:  500 H tgts; 500 S tgts/day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=0.50 hr.



































4(k) With latency of 0.5 hour there is an effect in improving classification, but more 
of an effect from improving BDA quality.  
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Figure(s) 5:  Architecture 2  
The basic Figure 4(a) applies here first, showing the assumed arrival of Red targets 
into region R and the number undetected.  
Number undetected tgts
Architecture II: Immediate BDA 
Constant Input Rate : 500 H tgts, 500 S tgts per day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr.


























5(b) Same general pattern as 4(b): using Architecture 2 with 1 hour latency the 
number of undetected targets (b-1) remains small if classification and BDA are perfect, 
but continue to grow (but at a slower rate than for Architecture 1) if classification and 
BDA skills are 50%. Again, (b-3) the number of undetected targets is reduced more by 
improving BDA than by improving classification.  
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Number undetected tgts
Architecture II: Immediate BDA 
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts, 500 S tgts per day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=0.50 hr.




























5(c) Latency of 0.5 hour leads as before to steady-state backlogs of undetected 
targets: (c-1) perfect classification and BDA yield very small such backlogs; (c-2) 50% 
classification and BDA is essentially the same (about 370) as in Architecture 1; (c-3) 
improvement of BDA to perfect (100%) here reduces backlog to ~ 130, an improvement 
over Architecture 1.  
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Total Number of Wpns shot
Architecture II: Immediate BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts / day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr.





























5(d) When latency is 1 hour the total number of weapons shot is reduced quite 
marginally, to about 100,000 from Architecture 1 when classification and BDA are (d-1) 
both 50%, and (d-2) when classification is improved to 100%, BDA remaining at 100%. 
Improving BDA to 100% leads to improvement with classification at 50%, but gives 
nearly the same result as in Architecture 1.  
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Total Number of Wpns shot
Architecture II: Immediate BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts / day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=.50 hr.





























5(e) If latency is reduced to 0.5 hour the number of weapons shot is noticeably 
reduced, case-by-case, from expenditures in Architecture 1. 
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Total number tgts killed
Architecture II: Immediate BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts per day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr. 


























5(f) When the latency is one hour the number of targets killed is ~ 50,000 when 
classification and BDA is perfect; this is the same as Architecture 1. When BDA is 
perfect, but classification is 50%, the result is the same as for Architecture 1. Architecture 
2 results in slightly more kills than Architecture 1 in the other cases.  
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Total number tgts killed
Architecture II: Immediate BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts per day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=0.5 hr. 


























5(g) Decreasing the latency to 0.5 hour results in all degrees of classification-BDA 
quality (examined) being equivalent, achieving 50,000 kills after 50 days.  
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Number of Erroneous Wpns Shot 
Architecture II: Immediate BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts/day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr. 





























5(h) For latency 1 hour: (h-1) the number of erroneous weapons shot increases nearly 
linearly to ~ 60,000 in 50 days, when classification and BDA qualities are both 50%, very 
little less than in Architecture 1. Increasing BDA alone to 100% drops the expenditure to 
~ 40,000, but instead increasing classification alone to 100% reduces expenditures to 
slightly less than the corresponding Architecture 1 figure.  
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Number of Erroneous Wpns shot 
Architecture II: Immediate BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts per day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=.50 hr. 





























5(i) Decreasing latency to 0.5 hour makes negligible difference in the  
cross-architecture erroneous weapon expenditure except when classification is 100%, and 
BDA quality 50%: then the shorter latency is associated with close to a 50% decrease in 
erroneous shots.  
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Number of Red Wpns Expended
Architecture II: Immediate BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts/day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=1 hr.
































Number of Red wpns Expended
Architecture II: Immediate BDA
Constant Input Rate: 500 H tgts; 500 S tgts/day
 pH|H=pH|S=pS|S=0.7; pS|H=0.1; 100 shooters
missile firing latency=.50 hr.




































Expected Number of Times Through the Shooting Server for Architecture 1 
There are j = 1, …, J types of targets. When a live target of type j is acquired it is 
classified as a type k with probability cjk(a). The classification of the target influences the 
weapon that will be shot at it. The probability a shot kills a target of type j that is 
classified as type k is pjk. After each shot, battle damage assessment (BDA) is performed. 
The probability a dead target of type j is correctly assessed as dead is mj(d). If a dead 
target is misclassified as live, it is returned to the shooter server. The probability the 
shooter server classifies a dead target of type j as a type k is cjk(d). Once a dead target is 
classified as dead, it is removed from the list of targets. The target is reclassified 
independently each time the target passes through the shooter server.  
A target of type j can pass through the shooter server more than once while it is alive 
and may return to the shooter server when it is dead if it is misclassified as live.  
Let  
NA(j) = Number of times through the shooter server for a type j target while it is alive 
ND(j) = Number of times through shooter server for a type j target while it is dead 
NT(j) = Total number of times through the shooter server (both alive and dead) for a 
type j target 
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where  
 E N j c d m d E N jD jk j
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Suppose there are two target types: Hard (H) and Soft (S). Let the probability of 
correct target classification be cHH = cSS = c. Let the probability of correct BDA of a dead 
target as dead be mj(d) = m.  
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 f c cp c pHH HSb g b g= + −1  (III.8) 
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Note that,  
 ∂∂ = -
-
c
E N H p p
f cT
HH HSb g b g2  (III.9) 
 ∂∂ = -m E N H mT b g
1
2  (III.10) 
Note that (III.9) and (III.10) are both nonpositive. If (III.9) > (III.10) then increasing 
the probability of correct BDA, m, will result in a greater decrease in the expected 
number of shots required to kill and correctly assess a dead target as dead than increasing 
the probability of correct classification, c.  
The figures below display regions in which it is better to increase the probability of 
correct BDA assessment, m, than to increase the probability of correct target 
classification, c, and vice-versa. Values of the probability of correct target classification, 
c, are plotted on the y-axis and the values for the probability of correct BDA, m, are 
plotted on the x-axis. The plotted line are those values of (m, c) such that (III.9) is equal 
to (III.10). If the value of (m, c) is above the line, then increasing m will result in a 
greater decrease in the expected number of shots required to kill a hard target and 
correctly assess the dead target is dead than increasing the probability of correct target 
classification, c. If the value of (m, c) is below the line, then increasing the probability of 
correct target classification, c, will result in a larger decrease in the expected number of 
shots required to kill a target and correctly assess it is killed than increasing the 
probability of correct BDA.  
For fixed value of m, let c(m) be that value of c for which (III.9) equals (III.10). If  
c > c(m), increasing the probability of correct BDA, m, results in a larger decrease in the 
expected number of shots required to kill and correctly assess that a dead target is dead 
than increasing the probability of correct classification c. Comparison of the four figures 
shows the following about the behavior of c(m). The value of c(m) is nondecreasing as 
the value of m increases. If the probability of kill is the same for a correctly classified 
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target and an incorrectly classified target, then (III.9) equals 0 and it is always better to 
increase the probability of correct BDA, m. The largest value of m such that c(m) = 0 
(increasing the probability of correct BDA is always better) decreases as the difference 
between the probability of kill for a correctly classified target and the probability of kill 
for an incorrectly classified target increases. The smallest value of m such that c(m) = 1 
(increasing the probability of correct target classification is always better) increases as the 
difference between the probability of kill for a correctly classified target and the 
probability of kill for an incorrectly classified target increases. If for some m, 0 < c(m) < 
1, then increasing the difference between the probability of kill for a correctly classified 
target and an incorrectly classified target will decrease the value of c(m). Hence, 
increasing the probability of kill for a correctly classified target while keeping the 
probability of kill for an incorrectly classified target the same may make it more 
advantageous to increase the probability of correct BDA.  
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If c is above the line, increasing the Prob. of correct BDA, m, will result
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